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Confronting Confrontation in a FaceTime
Generation: A Substantial Public Policy Standard to
Determine the Constitutionality of Two-Way Live
Video Testimony in Criminal Trials
“Got a problem with me, say it to my face, to my face, to my
face . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
The judge asks the prosecution to call its next witness against
the criminal defendant. The judge and jury watch as the bailiff
administers the oath to the witness, who swears to “tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”2 Then, the testimony
begins—but the witness stand is empty. This is because the witness
is testifying via two-way live video. His image appears on a large
screen in the courtroom, visible to everyone—judge, jury,
attorneys, defendant, and spectators.3 The witness likewise has his
own screen on which he can see the entire courtroom.4 The
testimony proceeds normally: direct examination and then crossexamination. With the exception of the witness’s physical absence,
the two-way live video testimony seems completely ordinary; and
yet, the technological advancements that make this seemingly
ordinary witness testimony possible present serious constitutional
issues unforeseen by the Framers.
This Comment addresses whether two-way live video
testimony in criminal trials violates the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, which ensures that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”5 The Supreme Court in Maryland
v. Craig upheld one-way live video testimony in the context of
child abuse cases to protect child victims from the presence of the
Copyright 2014, by J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA.
1. LUDACRIS, Say It to My Face, on 1.21 GIGAWATTS: BACK TO THE FIRST
TIME (Self-released 2011).
2. See, e.g., Aidan C. O’Brien, Nothing but the Truth, THEGUARDIAN (May
22, 2012, 9:01 AM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/belief/2012
/may/22/abolish-oaths-court, archived at http://perma.cc/P2NH-SDMV.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (describing how people in the courtroom could see the witness on the
screen).
4. See id. (“[T]he witnesses could see the temporary courtroom in the U.S.
Attorney’s conference room.”). This view, however, is not always immune from
technical difficulties. See id. n.2 (noting “some technical difficulties that
impacted the abilities of the witnesses”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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defendant, based on the “important public policy” of protecting
child abuse victims from further traumatization.6 But courts and
scholars have disagreed about whether and how to apply Craig to
two-way live video testimony in contexts other than child abuse cases
where there is no similarly important public policy.7 The Court’s
subsequent upheaval of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in
Crawford v. Washington especially complicates these disagreements
because the Court rejected the concept of “reliability” that
undergirded the Craig decision.8 Additionally, the Court’s
Confrontation Clause decisions following Crawford have obscured
the extent of Crawford’s holding, insomuch that scholars have
described the decisions as “vague[], uncertain, unpredictable, a
mess, almost arbitrary, incoherent, and an exercise in fiction.”9
Amidst this unrest, prosecutors continue to use two-way live video
testimony and defendants continue to challenge its use.10 As the
popularity of such testimony grows,11 and the technological ease of
6. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 859–60 (1990); see also
discussion infra Part I.B.2.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also discussion
infra Part I.B.3.
9. Dylan O. Keenan, Note, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the
Lower Courts, 122 YALE L.J. 782, 786 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the disagreements surrounding Crawford are
illustrated—and perhaps, complicated—by the Roberts Court’s willingness to hear
Confrontation Clause cases nearly every term since Crawford. See Williams v.
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490 (2011); Greene
v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705
(2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008);
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813
(2006); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005).
10. Since 2012, the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony in
criminal trials has been litigated dozens of times in state and federal courts. See,
e.g., Collins v. Cain, No. 13–0251, 2013 WL 4891923 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013);
People v. Novak, 971 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Cnty. Ct. 2013); State v. Seelig, 738 S.E.2d
427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Smith, 308 P.3d 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013);
People v. Lujan, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727 (Ct. App. 2012) (modified on rehearing
on other grounds); United States v. Sapse, No. 2:10–CR–00370–KJD, 2012 WL
5334630 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2012); Rivera v. State, 381 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.
2012); Paul v. State, No. 12–10–00280–CR, 2012 WL 3101743 (Tex. App. July
31, 2012); People v. Buie, 817 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 2012); Kramer v. State, 277
P.3d 88 (Wyo. 2012); United States v. Rosenau, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (W.D.
Wash. 2012).
11. In perhaps one of the most recent, infamous uses of live video testimony,
the State of Florida attempted to introduce a professor’s testimony via Skype in
George Zimmerman’s criminal trial for the shooting of Trayvon Martin. Suzanne
Choney, Skype Pranksters Interrupt Zimmerman Witness Testimony, NBC NEWS
(July 3, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/skype-pranksters-
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using it increases, a workable and doctrinally sound constitutional
standard for two-way live video testimony must be developed.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a
substantial public policy standard to determine the constitutionality of
two-way live video testimony. This proposal primarily emphasizes
that two-way video requires witnesses to do something that one-way
video, such as the system used in Craig, does not: it requires witnesses
to see the defendant and testify to the defendant’s face. Because of
two-way video’s better approximation of true physical confrontation,
this proposal lowers the bar that prosecutors must meet to use two-way
live video testimony by replacing Craig’s important public policy test
with a substantial public policy standard. This standard would allow
prosecutors to use two-way live video testimony in cases where the
use of such testimony would advance public policies that, although not
as important as protecting child abuse victims, are substantial enough
to further the administration of justice. The substantial public policy
standard would be doctrinally sound, grounded in reasoning that
follows a fortiori from Craig. Moreover, the standard would be
workable in practice, utilizing as guideposts lower courts’ decisions to
provide a framework for determining the circumstances in which twoway live video testimony is constitutional under the Confrontation
Clause. In an era where astounding technological advances are
commonplace, two-way live video will only become faster, better, and
easier. The proposed substantial public policy standard embraces this
reality and embodies a pragmatic solution—a solution for
confrontation in a FaceTime generation.12

interrupt-zimmerman-witness-testimony-6C10528962, archived at http://perma.cc
/8LS3-2QCY. The trial was streaming live on national television, and as a result,
the general public could see the prosecutor’s Skype screen name. Id. Within
seconds of the commencement of the testimony, dozens of people began to call the
prosecutor, creating annoying “beeps” within the courtroom that signaled
incoming calls. Id. The less-than-amused judge immediately discontinued the
video testimony. Id.
12. FaceTime is a software service developed by Apple that allows users
with Apple products to make two-way video calls to each other. See Daniel Eran
Dilger, Inside iPhone 4: FaceTime Video Calling, APPLE INSIDER (June 8, 2010,
6:00 PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/10/06/08/inside_iphone_4_facetime
_video_calling.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J9VS-WELP. The ease of
videoconferencing via technology like FaceTime seems destined to become a
hallmark of many aspects of life. See, e.g., Amit Jain, Visualize FaceTime as a
Videowall—That Is What Next-Generation Video Conferencing Looks Like,
BUSINESS 2 COMMUNITY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.business2community.com
/business-innovation/visualize-facetime-videowall-next-generation-video-confer
encing-looks-like-0620630#!tbkn7, archived at http://perma.cc/B7C8-KC62.
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Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the historical
origins of confrontation and the Court’s evolving interpretations of the
Confrontation Clause. Part II turns to the difficulties surrounding twoway live video testimony and collects judicial answers to the question
of when such testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. By doing
so, the analysis reveals that lower courts, in fact, mostly agree that
Craig applies to two-way live video testimony; nonetheless, courts
disagree about how the Craig test applies. Part II then takes the novel
step of outlining scholars’ proposals addressing two-way live video
testimony. This examination subsequently describes the various
counterarguments to these proposals, revealing the deep disagreements
illustrative of the general confusion surrounding the constitutionality
of two-way live video testimony. To resolve this disagreement, Part III
proposes a standard that allows the use of two-way live video
testimony that advances both important public policies and public
policies that are less important than Craig’s articulated policy of
protecting child abuse victims. Recognizing two-way live video’s
superior replication of true physical confrontation, this proposal
argues that prosecutors should not have to meet Craig’s important
public policy requirement because a defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause are better protected by two-way live video than
by one-way live video. This proposal thus presents the Court with the
best means of preserving Craig, reconciling differing judicial and
scholarly opinions, and addressing the increasingly prevalent use of
two-way live video testimony in criminal trials.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF CONFRONTATION
The Confrontation Clause lacks any legislative history that
might indicate its sources, justifications, or purposes.13 References
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
176 n.8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he usual primary sources and
digests of the early debates contain no informative material on the confrontation
right . . . .”); ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1992) (noting that the “origins of confrontation are
obscure”); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1951) (stating that the
development of the right to confrontation cannot be definitively traced);
Matthew J. Tokson, Comment, Virtual Confrontation: Is Videoconference
Testimony by an Unavailable Witness Constitutional?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581,
1585 (2007) (“There is virtually no traditional legislative history on the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”); Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video
Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Protecting Vulnerable Victims After
Crawford, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 187 (2012) (“There is a virtual lack of
legislative history pertaining to the adoption of the Confrontation Clause into the
Sixth Amendment.”).
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to the right to confrontation, however, have existed since Biblical
times under Hebrew and Roman law in that both traditions
required witnesses to testify in person in the defendant’s
presence.14 For example, when chief priests and elders of the Jews
called for the apostle Paul’s death, Roman governor Festus replied:
“It is not the custom of the Romans to deliver any man to
destruction before the accused meets the accusers face to face.”15
Yet, although the Church initially adhered to this right to
confrontation after the legal establishment of Christianity in the
Roman Empire,16 ecclesiastical and secular courts soon crippled
that right, giving way to private examinations outside the presence
of the defendant.17 A similar absence of the right to confrontation
14. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“The right of an accused to meet his accusers face-to-face is
mentioned in, among other things, the Bible . . . .” (citing Acts 25:16)); Richard
D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1202 (2002) (“The ancient Hebrews required accusing witnesses to give
their testimony in front of the accused . . . .”); Norman W. Spaulding, The
Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead
Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 330 (2012) (“Recent research
reveals that the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses . . .
[has] roots in . . . Hebrew law . . . .”). Roman criminal law utilized an
accusatorial model of criminal procedure that entailed a “viva voce
requirement.” See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the
Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA.
J. INT’L L. 481, 484 (1994) (“Roman criminal procedure . . . was accusatorial.”).
This requirement demanded that witnesses appear in person and testify orally
before the trier of fact. Id. at 485–89; Frank R. Herrmann, The Establishment of
a Rule Against Hearsay in Romano-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
42 (1995) (“Witnesses are said to be [those] who say those things in person
[viva voce] . . . .”).
15. Acts 25:16 (New King James Version).
16. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 14, at 494 (noting that the Church
prioritized having the accused and accuser simultaneously present in an
adjudicatory forum).
17. Id. at 515. Legal scholars contended that private examinations prevented
parties from telling their own witnesses what other witnesses had said, thereby
enabling the best means of obtaining truthful testimony. Id. at 516. This
procedure came to be known as the “Daniel and Susanna” procedure. Id. at 518.
The name of the procedure comes from a biblical narrative concerning Susanna,
a woman who spurned the advances of two men. Daniel 13:1–63. In revenge,
the two men falsely accused Susanna of committing adultery with a young man
in an orchard. Id. An assembly of the people conducted a trial of Susanna and
initially believed the men, condemning her to death. Id. Daniel was moved by
the spirit of God at this point and intervened. Id. He examined each of the men
separately and out of the other’s presence. Id. He then asked each man to name
the tree under which the man allegedly saw Susanna with a lover. Id. One man
said it was a mastic tree. Id. The other man said it was an oak tree. Id. The
glaring discrepancy convinced the assembly that the men were lying, and
Susanna was acquitted. Id.
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existed in England at the time of the formation of the colonies.18
Indeed, the use of ex parte examinations effectively denied
defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them.19 It is
this abuse of the right to confrontation in England that likely
influenced the drafters of state constitutions and the United States
Constitution to support and implement confrontation clauses.20
Therefore, this Part provides a summary of the history of
confrontation that preceded the adoption of the Confrontation
Clause, beginning in England and concluding with the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment. It then discusses the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause.
A. The Historical Foundations of Confrontation: From England to
the United States
In the seventeenth century, English courts did not require the
production of witnesses or their examinations in court.21 As a
result, prosecutors routinely introduced depositions in lieu of live
courtroom testimony over the defendants’ requests for face-to-face
confrontation.22 Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason in 1603
popularly serves as one of the most frequently cited examples of
these abuses.23 Accused of plotting to assassinate James VI of
Scotland, Raleigh attempted to defend against written accusations.24
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.
19. See id.
20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
21. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV.
537, 543 (2003). To be sure, witnesses did testify before juries in England at this
time; nevertheless, the prosecution largely decided whether they were called to
testify or whether they testified by deposition. Id. n.21.
22. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (1 JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883)).
23. E.g., Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation
Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 150 (1995) (“More than any other story, the story
of Raleigh’s case, handed down over generations, has driven Anglo-American
lawyers to limit the use of hearsay and to ensure a right of confrontation.”);
White, supra note 21, at 541 (“History teaches that the [Confrontation] Clause
has far earlier beginnings [than Raleigh’s trial], but it remains emotionally linked
with the conviction, and eventual beheading, of Raleigh based on proof made through
ex parte affidavits.”); Raymond LaMagna, Note, (Re)Constitutionalizing
Confrontation: Reexamining Unavailability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79
S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1520 (2006) (“Legendary among [defendants demanding
face-to-face confrontation] was Sir Walter Raleigh, whose 1603 trial for treason
is popularly credited with embedding confrontation into the public’s conception
of justice.”).
24. Raleigh’s Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).
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Specifically, the prosecution relied upon a sworn confession signed by
Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham.25 In response,
Raleigh demanded that Cobham be present in the courtroom to deliver
his testimony.26 The court rejected Raleigh’s protests.27 Raleigh was
thereafter convicted and sentenced to die.28 Consequently, the
relatively recent history of similar injustices during the revolutionary
period undeniably contributed to the adoption of confrontation clauses
in the United States.29
With these abuses of ex parte examinations at common law in
mind, the language in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause likely finds its roots in early state constitutions.30 Scholars
generally agree that Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England was the primary source for the drafting of confrontation
clauses in state constitutions.31 In 1776, Virginia was the first state
25. See White, supra note 21, at 542 (“The prosecution, led by Sir Edward
Coke, introduced evidence in the form of a sworn confession from Raleigh’s
alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham.”).
26. Raleigh’s Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. at 15 (“But it is strange to see how you
press me still with my Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him . . . . [H]e is
in the house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and
if he will accuse me or avow this confession of his, it shall convict me and ease
you of further proof.”).
27. Id. Interestingly enough, the same judge who rejected Raleigh’s
arguments later praised the virtues of live testimony. See LaMagna, supra note
23, at 1521 (“For the Testimonies, being viva voce before the Judges in open
face of the world . . . [are] much to be preferred before written depositions by
private examiners or Commissioners. First, for that the Judge and Jurors discern
often by the countenance of a Witness whether he come prepared, and by his
readiness and slackness, whether he be ill affected or well affected, and by short
questions may draw out circumstances to approve or discredit his testimony, and
one witness may contest with another where they are viva voce. All which are
taken away by written depositions.” (quoting Case of the Union of the Realms,
(1606) 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 913 (K.B.) (Popham, C.J.))); see also White, supra
note 21, at 543 (“Because Raleigh was denied that right [of confrontation] and
quickly sentenced to die, one of the four trial judges later lamented that the trial
had injured and degraded the justice of England.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
28. As one scholar notes, the King later pardoned Raleigh, but kept him in
the tower of London. See White, supra note 21, at 543 n.20. After many years,
Raleigh was ultimately executed for additional offenses and treason that were
“not pardonable.” Id.
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. White, supra note 21, at 550.
31. Id. at 551 n.78 (“These volumes were avidly sought in the colonies and
had inestimable impact there on the development and growth of the law and
legal attitudes.” (quoting Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What
Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67, 72 (1969))). To be sure, Blackstone’s writings
were quite persuasive with respect to the preference for live, in person
examination and its benefits. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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to complete its Declaration of Rights, which included a defendant’s
right “in all capital or criminal prosecutions . . . to be confronted
with the accusers and witnesses.”32 Over the next eight years,
seven other states constructed and adopted similar confrontation
clauses in their respective constitutions.33 This trend culminated in
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.34

*373–75 (“This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in
the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from
the civil law: where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he
will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal . . . . Besides the
occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the
witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of
interrogatories previously penned and settled: and the confronting of adverse
witnesses is also another opportunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can
never be had upon any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge,
during the examination, a matter of small importance; for besides the respect
and awe, with which his presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able by
use and experience to keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue.
In short by this method of examination, and this only, the persons who are to
decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age,
education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which
points all persons must appear alike; when their depositions are reduced to
writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of those who made them: and yet
as much may be frequently collected from the manner in which the evidence is
delivered, as from the matter of it.”); see also supra note 14 (discussing viva
voce requirement).
32. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235 (1971);
Larkin, supra note 31, at 75.
33. See Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776), reprinted in 1 THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 278; Maryland
Declaration of Rights § XIX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 282; Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights § XII (1780), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 32, at 342; New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV (1783),
reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32,
at 377; North Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII (1776), reprinted in 1 THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 287;
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 265; Vermont
Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 323.
34. See, e.g., White, supra note 21, at 550 (“Despite the general agreement
that confrontation rights have ambiguous beginnings and that no history of the
Clause can be proclaimed with certainty, it is without question that the language
ultimately used in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was derived from
state constitutions.”).
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Indeed, many of the individuals who drafted and ratified the Bill of
Rights were the drafters of these state constitutions, and so they
observed firsthand the development of the American adversarial
system, including the right to confrontation.35 Thus, it is
unsurprising that the draft of the Bill of Rights included the right to
confrontation in what would become the Sixth Amendment.36
This right to confrontation, however, was not included in the
original text of the United States Constitution. During the formation of
the Constitution, Abraham Holmes of the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention objected that the proposed document did not guarantee
“whether [a defendant] is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to
face; whether he is to be allowed to confront the witnesses.”37 A
compromise materialized thereafter, and the states agreed to ratify the
Constitution as proposed on the condition that the first Congress
would adopt a bill of rights, which would encompass, inter alia, an
amendment ensuring the right to confrontation.38 On June 8, 1789,
James Madison introduced to the House of Representatives a proposal
that would become the Sixth Amendment,39 which substantially
mirrored the language used in the Virginia Constitution.40 In
particular, it guaranteed that an accused would have the right to be
confronted “with his accusers, and the witnesses against him.”41 A
subsequent revision deleted the words “his accusers,”42 and the
final version of the Sixth Amendment provided:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

35. Id. at 552. These drafters necessarily also witnessed the attempts of
England to interfere with the right to confrontation by removing accused
defendants to England for trial. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 110–11 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836).
38. LaMagna, supra note 23, at 1525.
39. Id.
40. White, supra note 21, at 552 (“When James Madison introduced the
Sixth Amendment[,] it contained substantially the same language as that used in
the Virginia Constitution.”).
41. Id. (citing Larkin, supra note 31, at 76).
42. Id.
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process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.43
This version of the Sixth Amendment contains what is now known
as the “Confrontation Clause” and was adopted on December 15,
1791.44
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretations of the Confrontation
Clause
Because of the relative dearth of historical interpretive
materials to explain the Confrontation Clause, for a long time the
Supreme Court felt free to follow its own interpretive path.45 At the
beginning of this path, the Court developed a test centered upon
reliability and public policy, exemplified in the video-testimony
context by Maryland v. Craig.46 More recently, however, the Court
has undertaken an originalist reconstruction of its Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence focused on the notions of “testimoniality,”
witness unavailability, and the defendant’s opportunity for crossexamination, as articulated in Crawford v. Washington.47 This
Section describes this evolution.
1. Reliability and Important Public Policies: The Path to Craig
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court set
forth its first significant interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
which ensured the right to confrontation unless public policy
overrode that right.48 At issue in Mattox v. United States was the
admission of a stenographer’s notes of a dead witness’s testimony
from a prior trial as evidence in a new criminal trial.49 The
Supreme Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause compels
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44. LaMagna, supra note 23, at 1525.
45. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v.
Washington Does Nothing More Than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 305, 305–06 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court’s Confrontation
Clause analyses have “caused much confusion” and concurring that the opinions
are as “drunken lurching from lightpost to lightpost in search of a viable
confrontation theory”).
46. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); see also discussion infra
Part I.B.2.
47. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also discussion
infra Part I.B.3.
48. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
49. Id. at 251 (Shiras, J., dissenting). Mattox had previously been tried and
convicted of murder. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently invalidated the
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
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a witness to face the defendant and jury so that those individuals
may affect and assess the witness’s demeanor.50 Yet, the Court
noted that this right to confrontation “must occasionally give way
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”51
Ultimately, the Court admitted the notes of the witness’s prior
testimony, holding that public policy prohibits a criminal from
going free just because a witness died and thus could not testify.52
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court added the concept of
reliability to guide analyses in which public policies may trump the
right to confrontation.53 In Ohio v. Roberts, a witness testified at a
preliminary hearing but did not show up to testify at trial.54 The
court admitted the transcript of the witness’s prior testimony over
the defendant’s objection.55 Affirming the admission of the
transcript, the Court proceeded as it did in Mattox, contending that
certain competing interests and policies might justify dispensing
with confrontation at trial.56 For these situations, the Court created
a two-pronged test, which allowed prior testimony if: (1) the
witness was unavailable;57 and (2) the testimony had sufficient
“indicia of reliability.”58 Applying this test, the Court concluded
that the witness was unavailable and that her prior testimony was
reliable by definition because the witness testified under oath and
was subjected to cross-examination.59 Thus, the Roberts Court
refined its Mattox analysis and laid the foundation upon which the
Craig Court would later consider the constitutionality of one-way
live video testimony.
2. Craig: The Constitutionality of One-Way Live Video
Testimony
In Maryland v. Craig, Justice O’Connor phrased the question
before the Court as whether the Confrontation Clause “prohibits a
child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a
50. Id. at 242–43 (majority opinion). In so emphasizing, the Court observed
that the primary object of the Confrontation Clause was to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits from being used against a defendant in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness. Id.
51. Id. at 243.
52. Id. at 243–44.
53. See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
54. Id. at 58–59.
55. Id. at 59–60.
56. Id. at 64.
57. A court may consider a witness “unavailable” under several situations.
See FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing scenarios).
58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
59. Id. at 73.
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defendant at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by
one-way closed circuit television.”60 In Craig, a grand jury
indicted Sandra Ann Craig with child abuse.61 At trial, the State
invoked a Maryland statutory procedure that sanctioned the use of
one-way closed circuit television to procure a child’s testimony if,
during normal testimony, the child would suffer serious emotional
distress in the presence of the accused.62 Under this procedure, the
child, the prosecutor, and defense counsel withdrew to a separate
room while the judge, jury, and defendant remained in the
courtroom.63 The parties then examined and cross-examined the
child in the separate room, while a video monitor streamed the live
video and audio of the examination in the courtroom.64 Craig
remained in electronic contact with her defense counsel and the
parties entered objections, which the court ruled on as if the
witness were in the courtroom.65 Nonetheless, Craig objected to
use of the procedure on Confrontation Clause grounds.66
The Court upheld the use of the one-way video testimony in a
5-4 decision.67 The Court primarily enumerated four fundamental
requirements of the Confrontation Clause: (1) physical presence of
the witness; (2) testimony by the witness under oath; (3) crossexamination of the witness by defense counsel; and (4) observation
of the witness’s demeanor by the jury.68 The Court acknowledged
that the video testimony in question did not demand the physical
presence of the witness.69 Nevertheless, the Court contended that
the clear satisfaction of the three remaining factors made the
child’s testimony sufficiently reliable.70 The Court further
reinforced its argument by highlighting the compelling state
interests in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
child abuse victims.71 Thus, emphasizing its “non-absolute”

60. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 841.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 842.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 838.
68. Id. at 845–46.
69. Id. at 851.
70. Id. Specifically, the Court noted that “[t]he child witness must be
competent to testify and must testify under oath; the defendant retains full
opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and
defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of
the witness as he or she testifies.” Id.
71. Id. at 852–54.
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interpretation of the right of confrontation,72 the Court held that
one-way live video testimony is constitutional on two conditions:
(1) the state must make a showing of necessity by demonstrating
an important public policy of protecting child witnesses from the
trauma of testifying in the defendant’s presence;73 and (2) the
procedure, despite the absence of physical confrontation, must
ensure the reliability of the evidence by preserving the essence of
effective confrontation.74 This is the test that courts typically
extend to govern two-way live video testimony.75
3. Crawford: An Overhaul of Confrontation Clause
Jurisprudence
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court retreated from its initial
emphasis on reliability, effectively transforming its Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. In Crawford v. Washington, Michael Crawford
was charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing Kenneth
Lee.76 At trial, Crawford argued self-defense.77 This theory, however,
conflicted with a recorded statement given by Crawford’s wife during
a police interrogation prior to Crawford’s trial, suggesting that perhaps
Crawford did not stab Lee in self-defense.78 Because of a state marital
privilege rule that prohibited a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse’s consent, Crawford’s wife was unable to testify.79 Thus, the
prosecution attempted to introduce her recorded statement in lieu of
her live testimony.80 The trial court admitted the statement into
evidence,81 which Crawford alleged to be a violation of his
constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.82
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia conducted a historical
analysis to ultimately hold that the admission of the recorded statement
violated Crawford’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.83 Justice
Scalia emphasized that the Confrontation Clause’s fundamental
protection is its assurance of reliable testimony.84 Here, however, the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 849.
Id. at 850, 856–57.
Id. at 850, 857.
See discussion infra Part II.A.1–2.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 38–40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40–69.
Id.
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Court diverged from its prior jurisprudence.85 Although it
acknowledged that the Confrontation Clause demands reliable
testimony, the Court argued that the Roberts test injected subjective
judicial determinations that were detrimental to the spirit of the
Confrontation Clause.86 Instead, Justice Scalia stated that history
dictates that the primary safeguards of confrontation entail witness
unavailability and cross-examination of the witness.87 Thus, the Court
overruled the Roberts test and its subscription to unilateral judicial
determinations of reliability.88 The Court held that the prosecution
may admit testimonial89 hearsay only if: (1) the witness is unavailable;
and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.90 This is the now well-known Crawford test.
So, Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
demonstrates that there are two arguably viable tests—the Craig test
and the Crawford test—that might govern the constitutionality of twoway live video testimony. However, each test has potential drawbacks.
Some scholars question whether Craig is still good law after Crawford
given the Craig Court’s reliance upon Roberts for its understanding of
reliability and the Crawford Court’s subsequent rejection of Roberts.91
On the other hand, some courts and scholars question whether video
testimony should be considered hearsay for the purposes of
Crawford.92 That is, because Crawford expressly addressed
testimonial hearsay,93 which is an out of court statement that the
85. Id. at 61.
86. Id. at 62–69.
87. Id. at 68.
88. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“I dissent
from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts . . . .”).
89. The term “testimonial” refers to statements made in “material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). Notably, the
Crawford Court “[left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 68. The scope of the term “testimonial” is as
of yet unclear, despite the Court’s attempts to refine the definition. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Comment, testimony via
two-way live video would undoubtedly be “testimonial” in the most basic sense
of the word; thus, this Comment foregoes significant inquiry into this aspect of
Crawford’s potential application.
90. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
91. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
92. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
93. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at
issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would
an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether. Where testimonial [hearsay] is at issue, however, the Sixth
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declarant does not make while testifying at trial,94 it seems that live
testimony at trial via video is not hearsay within the purview of
Crawford.95 This uncertainty is illustrated—and compounded—by
numerous approaches to the constitutional question.
II. APPROACHES TO TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY UNDER THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Against this historical and jurisprudential backdrop, lower
courts and scholars attempting to apply the underlying principles
of confrontation to two-way live video testimony have come to
vastly different conclusions. This Part first reviews how the federal
circuit courts have addressed the issue, analyzing decisions that
have applied Craig and found the testimony both constitutional
and unconstitutional and discussing the Second Circuit’s decision
to not apply Craig at all. It then outlines four popular proposals by
scholars and responses that have been made to each proposal.
A. Federal Circuit Courts’ Approaches
Many scholars have noted a purported circuit split in the
federal circuit courts’ approaches to two-way live video testimony
because the Second Circuit has refused to apply Craig to two-way
video.96 This Section illustrates, however, that although there is a
circuit split that hinges upon whether to apply Craig to two-way
live video testimony, the majority of circuit courts that have
addressed the issue fall on one side of the split—Craig applies.97
Thus, while there is technically a “circuit split” on whether to
apply Craig at all, it is quite lopsided and there is mostly a

Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” (emphasis added)).
94. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that . . . the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing . . . .”).
95. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
96. See, e.g., Marc Chase McAllister, Two-Way Video Trial Testimony and
the Confrontation Clause: Fashioning a Better Craig Test in Light of Crawford,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 835, 845 (2007) (noting the “federal circuit split”);
Brooks, supra note 13, at 202 (noting the “uncertainty and the circuit split in
Gigante and Yates”); Tokson, supra note 13, at 1592 (noting the “circuit split
regarding the constitutionality of two-way video testimony”); Christine L. Olson,
Comment, Accusations from Abroad: Testimony of Unavailable Witnesses Via Live
Two-Way Videoconferencing Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1671, 1689 (2008) (advocating that the Supreme
Court “resolve the circuit split”).
97. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–3.
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consensus among the circuits. However, there is widespread
disagreement on the more practical question of how to apply Craig
to two-way live video testimony. This Section describes the
circumstances where courts have applied Craig and found such
testimony constitutional, circumstances where courts have applied
Craig and found such testimony unconstitutional, and finally the
Second Circuit’s refusal to apply Craig altogether. It then concludes
by highlighting principles that contextualize the following analysis of
scholarship.
1. Federal Circuit Courts Applying Craig and Finding TwoWay Video Testimony Constitutional
After Craig, circuit courts began to extend the Craig test to
two-way live video testimony in child abuse cases, reading Craig
to protect child victims from the presence of the defendant rather
than from the image of the defendant. In these cases, courts
routinely held such testimony constitutional as long as the lower
courts found that the child displayed a fear of being in the
defendant’s presence.98 For example, in United States v. Weekley,
the Sixth Circuit upheld the use of two-way live video testimony
because the district court determined that the child “genuinely
feared” the defendant and there was a “substantial likelihood that
[the child] would suffer emotional trauma” if required to testify in
the defendant’s presence.99 Similarly, in United States v. Rouse,
the Eighth Circuit upheld two-way live video testimony because
the district court found that the children believed that the
defendants would attack them if they entered the courtroom.100
Numerous other circuits have come to identical conclusions in
similar cases.101
98. See, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 1997)
(emphasizing the “trauma [to the child] that would be caused by [the child]
testifying in the physical presence of the defendant” (quoting Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 851, 857 (1990))); United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 753
(6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 857).
99. Weekley, 130 F.3d at 752.
100. Rouse, 111 F.3d at 568.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994)
(upholding the testimony because the district court concluded that there was a
substantial likelihood of the child suffering emotional trauma if forced to testify
in the courtroom); United States v. Carrier, 9 F.3d 867, 870–71 (10th Cir. 1993)
(upholding the testimony because the district court found that testifying in the
defendant’s presence would cause the child “severe” distress); United States v.
Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding the testimony because
the district court found that the child would likely suffer trauma if forced to
testify in the defendant’s presence).
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Courts likewise began to apply Craig to two-way live video
testimony in contexts other than child abuse cases. For example, in
Horn v. Quarterman, the prosecution in a Texas trial attempted to
introduce a witness’s testimony via two-way live video because the
witness was terminally ill with cancer and undergoing treatment in
Ohio.102 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that Craig governed the
inquiry into the constitutionality of the two-way live video
testimony.103 Specifically, the court recognized that the trial court
had conducted the “case-specific finding of necessity” mandated
by Craig by determining that the witness was ill and could not
travel.104 Accordingly, the court found that the terminally ill
witness’s testimony via two-way live video was constitutionally
sound.105 Similarly, in United States v. Benson, the Sixth Circuit
faced a situation where the witness who testified via two-way live
video was 85 years old and too ill to travel.106 Addressing the
defendant’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court’s
considerations of the witness’s major stomach surgery in the
previous year, extensive health problems, severe weight loss, and
fatigue satisfied the Craig test.107 Thus, many circuit courts have
applied Craig to both child abuse cases and non-child abuse cases,
allowing two-way live video testimony in a wide range of
scenarios as long as both the reliability and important public policy
prongs of the Craig test were satisfied.
2. Federal Circuit Courts Applying Craig and Finding TwoWay Video Testimony Unconstitutional
On the other hand, many circuit courts have extended Craig to
consider two-way live video testimony but have found the use of
such testimony unconstitutional because the facts in those cases
did not satisfy the Craig test.108 In the child-abuse context, for
example, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bordeaux held that
the district court’s considerations of and emphasis on a child’s fear
did not satisfy the Craig test.109 Specifically, the court found that,
because the child’s fear of the defendant was not the “dominant
102. Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 310 (5th Cir. 2007).
103. Id. at 317.
104. Id. at 318.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Benson, 79 F. App’x 813, 820 (6th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
107. Id. at 820–21.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 1998).
109. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 555.
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reason” why she could not testify in open court, use of two-way
live video testimony did not serve Craig’s important public policy
requirement.110 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Moses found a child’s testimony via two-way live video
unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause because the child
told the district court that she was not afraid of the defendant.111
Moreover, the court emphasized that courts commonly agree that a
child’s general fear of the courtroom is not sufficient to satisfy the
Craig test.112
In a non-child abuse context, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en
banc likewise found that two-way live video testimony violated a
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause because mere
efficiency of live video does not satisfy Craig.113 In United States
v. Yates, the federal government moved to allow two Australian
witnesses to testify via two-way live video.114 The government
emphasized that, although the witnesses were unwilling to travel to
the United States to testify (and were beyond the government’s
subpoena powers), they were willing to testify via live video.115
The government also argued that the witnesses were essential to its
case-in-chief, and the district court agreed.116 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit held that such testimony violated the defendant’s
constitutional rights.117 Relying upon circuit precedent, the court
affirmed that Craig is the appropriate test to determine the
admissibility of two-way live video testimony.118 The court then
110. Id. This decision echoed the Eighth Circuit’s decision the previous year
in United States v. Turning Bear, where the court held that a child’s general fear
of the courtroom environment did not satisfy Craig. United States v. Turning
Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 737 (8th Cir. 2004).
111. Moses, 137 F.3d at 898–99.
112. Id. (citing United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Carrier, 9 F.3d 867, 870–71 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d
885, 887 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
1993)).
113. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
114. Id. at 1310.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1318.
118. Id. at 1313 (citing Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930 (11th Cir.
2001) (where the Eleventh Circuit, on habeas review, held that the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision finding that Craig justified using two-way live video
testimony was not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of,
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court)). The court reinforced this
affirmation by noting that four other circuits agreed that Craig governs two-way
live video testimony. Id. (citing United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2004); United
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applied the two-pronged Craig analysis, focusing specifically on
the “important public policy” prong.119 Of course, presenting the
fact-finder with crucial evidence is an important public policy.120
Nevertheless, the court held that this policy was not important
enough to outweigh the defendant’s right to confront her accusers
face to face.121 The court noted that all criminal prosecutions
include evidence “crucial” to the government’s case.122 Moreover,
prosecutors could undoubtedly resolve more criminal cases
efficiently if it were unnecessary for witnesses to appear physically
at trial.123 Yet, the court reasoned that, if courts were to approve
this testimony for mere efficiency purposes, prosecutors would
argue for blanket rules allowing two-way live video testimony
under the guise of providing crucial prosecutorial evidence and
resolving cases expeditiously.124 Surely, the court opined, this was
not the type of important public policy that the Craig Court
required.125
Furthermore, the court emphasized that, under Craig, video
testimony must be necessary, not just more convenient, to further
an important public policy.126 The court held that “[i]n this case,
there simply is no necessity of the type Craig contemplates.”127 In
particular, the court noted that there were other available avenues
to obtain the testimony, including procedures for taking video
depositions.128 Consequently, the court concluded that this case
was no different from any other criminal prosecution in which the
government would find it convenient to present testimony via twoway live video.129 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the video
testimony in this case did not further an “important enough” public

States v. Moses, 130 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d
561 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Carrier, 9 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Garcia, 7
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir.
1993)). The court additionally chided the Second Circuit for “stand[ing] alone in
its refusal to apply Craig.” Id. at 1313–14.
119. Id. at 1315–18.
120. Id. at 1316.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1315–16.
126. Id. at 1316.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1316–18. These depositions are called “Rule 15 depositions.” See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
129. Yates, 438 F.3d at 1316.
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policy under the demands of Craig.130 As a result, the testimony
violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.131
3. The Second Circuit’s Rejection of Craig in United States v.
Gigante
In contrast with this nearly universal acceptance of Craig’s
reasoning in the context of two-way live video testimony, the
Second Circuit in one notable instance refused to apply the Craig
test to such testimony.132 In United States v. Gigante, the government
charged Mafia member Vincent Gigante with murder and labor
racketeering, alleging that he was the boss of the Genovese crime
family.133 A man named Peter Savino, a former associate of the
Genovese crime family, was a crucial witness against Gigante.134
Savino had previously cooperated with the government and was a
participant in the Federal Witness Protection Program.135 At the time
of Gigante’s trial, Savino was in the final stages of inoperable, fatal
cancer and was under medical supervision at a secret location.136
Thus, the government moved to allow Savino to testify via twoway live video.137 The district court allowed the testimony over
Gigante’s objection.138
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the testimony as
constitutional—but not under the Craig test.139 Instead, the court
distinguished Craig, arguing that the Craig Court crafted the
“important public policy” standard exclusively for one-way video
testimony, “whereby the witness could not possibly view the
defendant.”140 Here, the court contended, the district court used a
two-way system through which the witness could see the

130. Id. at 1314–18.
131. Id. at 1314.
132. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Yates,
438 F.3d at 1313–14 (“The Second Circuit stands alone in its refusal to apply
Craig.” (citing Gigante, 166 F.3d 75)).
133. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 78. The New York Mafia is comprised of five
organized crime families: the Bonnano, Colombo, Gambino, Lucchese, and
Genovese families, each spearheaded by a boss. Id. The government claimed
that Gigante was the boss of the Genovese family and supervised its criminal
activity. Id.
134. Id. at 79.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 80.
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id. at 81.
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defendant.141 Correspondingly, the court opined that two-way
video preserves the essence of confrontation in a manner that the
one-way video in Craig could not.142 For this reason, the court
concluded that it was unnecessary to enforce Craig’s arguably high
“important public policy” standard in this case.143
Rather, the Second Circuit upheld the video testimony by
analogy to the protections afforded by Rule 15 depositions.144
Under Rule 15, parties may take a deposition “[w]henever[,] due to
exceptional circumstances of the case[,] it is in the interest of
justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be
taken and preserved for use at trial.”145 That testimony may then be
admitted at trial “as substantive evidence if the witness is
unavailable.”146 The Second Circuit noted that a court could
consider a witness unavailable if he or she “is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of . . . physical or mental illness
or infirmity.”147 The Second Circuit reasoned that the trial court
could have admitted Savino’s testimony via these rules.148
Moreover, the court argued, two-way live video testimony actually
afforded greater protection of Gigante’s confrontation rights than
Rule 15 could afford because it forced Savino to testify live before
a jury, which in turn allowed the jury to assess his demeanor.149
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that it could not hold twoway live video testimony to a higher standard than the Rule 15
standard.150 In so holding, the court articulated its rule: “[u]pon a
finding of exceptional circumstances, such as were found in this
case, a trial court may allow a witness to testify via two-way
closed-circuit television when this furthers the interest of
justice.”151
From this survey of circuit court cases, two main points emerge
concerning the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony.
First, with the exception of the Second Circuit, the federal circuit
courts, as well as many district courts and state courts,152 seem to
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)).
146. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)).
147. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenau, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (W.D. Wa.
2012) (applying Craig and allowing a Canadian witness to testify via two-way
live video testimony because a Canadian court order prevented the witness from
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generally accept Craig as the appropriate test for determining the
constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. So, although
there is a circuit split, it is a very unbalanced one. The consensus
about which test should apply is actually fairly strong. Second, the
inconsistencies that do percolate amongst the lower courts seem to
stem not from troubles determining whether the Craig test applies,
but from efforts to determine how Craig applies—namely (1) what
constitutes an “important public policy” under Craig; and (2)
whether that definition varies depending upon which type of
system, one-way video or two-way video, is in question. Indeed,
these cases illustrate the confusion that stems from a type of
“vertical” analysis where courts measure the circumstances in each
case against the high standard of an important public policy
protecting child abuse victims.
B. Scholars’ Approaches
This conflicting jurisprudence has, in turn, encouraged a
diverse array of proposals put forth by scholars in an attempt to
solve the two-way live video testimony issue. This Section groups
the most popular proposals into four categories: those in favor of
complete constitutionality of the testimony; those who argue that
Crawford governs the testimony; those who claim that Craig
governs the testimony; and those who assert that all such testimony
is unconstitutional. This Section describes the arguments in favor
of each proposal and then discusses scholars’ objections to each
proposal.153

coming to the United States); Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 987 A.2d 743 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2009) (applying Craig, but finding that mere incarceration did not
justify a prisoner’s testimony via two-way live video); Bush v. Wyoming, 193
P.3d 203 (Wyo. 2008) (applying Craig and allowing a husband and his wife to
testify via two-way live video just because of the husband’s congestive heart
failure).
153. To be sure, some scholars have issued proposals advocating completely
new tests. See McAllister, supra note 96, at 870–71 (advocating a “Modified
Craig Test” that has numerous additional nuances); Tokson, supra note 13, at
1603–04 (advocating a less strict Craig test for unavailable witnesses where the
alternative is a Rule 15 deposition); Natalie D. Montell, Note, A New Test for
Two-Way Video Testimony: Bringing Maryland v. Craig into the Technological
Era, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 361, 377–81 (2011) (advocating a test dependent
upon whether the witness is “accusatory”); Michael R. Rocha, Note, Going Too
Far in United States v. Yates: The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Maryland v.
Craig to Two-Way Videoconferencing, 36 STETSON L. REV. 365, 391–93 (2007)
(advocating a test based on Gigante and Crawford); Yvonne M. Dutton, Virtual
Witness Confrontation in Criminal Cases: A Proposal to Use Videoconferencing
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1. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Undoubtedly
Constitutional
Some scholars have argued that two-way live video testimony
is constitutional in all cases.154 A number of these scholars base
their arguments upon the four elements of confrontation that Craig
emphasized: (1) personal examination; (2) testimony under oath;
(3) cross-examination of the witness by defense counsel; and (4)
observation of the witness by the jury.155 First, with respect to
personal examination, two-way live video testimony satisfies this
element because it subjects the witness to personal examination
that the defendant can fully observe.156 Second, the witness is
placed under oath prior to the commencement of the witness’s
testimony.157 Third, the defendant has the same opportunity to
cross-examine the witness testifying via the two-way live video
feed.158 Finally, the jury is given a full opportunity, and quite
possibly a better opportunity, to view the witness and the witness’s
demeanor during video testimony because the witness’s image is
projected onto a large television or screen.159 Accordingly, these
scholars argue, two-way live video testimony preserves the values
mandated by the Confrontation Clause.160
One objection to this argument is that lazy parties might rely too
heavily upon the ease of two-way live video testimony, thereby
destroying the Confrontation Clause’s seemingly inherent
preference for physical, face-to-face confrontation.161 Historically,
confrontation has almost exclusively entailed the simultaneous

Technology in Maritime Piracy Trials, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1283, 1330–
31 (2012) (advocating a three-pronged test for maritime piracy trials). This
Comment highlights only the more popular trends in the scholarship in order to
show a general trend of both scholarship and courts.
154. See, e.g., Hadley Perry, Comment, Virtually Face-to-Face: The
Confrontation Clause and the Use of Two-Way Video Testimony, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 565, 588–89 (2008); Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
155. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
156. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
157. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
158. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
159. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
160. See Perry, supra note 154, at 588–89; Brooks, supra note 13, at 204–07.
161. See generally Cathleen J. Cinella, Note, Compromising the Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation—United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 135, 159–60 (1998).
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physical presence of both the accused and the accuser.162 Moreover,
the public policy exception established by the Court anticipates
circumstances in which allowing the testimony would further an
important public policy.163 Allowing universal constitutionality of
two-way live video testimony would prevent courts from
considering important policies depending upon the unique
circumstances at hand.164 Thus, this objection argues, parties should
not be able to enact (at will) such a broad, sweeping use of new
technology that completely changes the manner in which courts
receive testimony.165 The ease of new technology should not by
itself overrule centuries of physical confrontation simply because it
is easier than requiring a witness’s physical presence in the
courtroom.
Relatedly, critics object that efficiency gains alone should not
suffice to eliminate a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights
under the Confrontation Clause.166 This objection is most
commonly made in rebuttal to the argument that sometimes the
testimony is so non-accusatorial and the disadvantages of requiring
a witness’s physical presence are so great that the efficiency of
video testimony is clearly superior to any reasonable expectation
of physical confrontation.167 Objectors point out that this argument
is contrary to contemporary understandings of constitutional rights,
under which mere efficiency cannot justify the elimination of a
constitutional right.168
Finally, one of the most common objections is that two-way
live video testimony eliminates the emotional tension in the
courtroom that stems from physical confrontation, thereby making
162. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Of course, the clear rebuttal
to this statement is that live video did not exist during the Framers’ era, so
physical confrontation was the only way confrontation could take place.
163. See discussion supra Part I.B.1–2 (noting important public policies such
as protecting a child abuse victim from the potential trauma of testifying in the
presence of the defendant); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
164. See Cinella, supra note 161, at 159–60.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. An example of this scenario might be where an old analyst is bedridden, lives thousands of miles away from the location of a trial, and would
only testify to “scientific tests far removed from the crime and the defendant.”
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 343–52 (2009) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that certain witnesses are not “witnesses against” a
defendant within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause).
168. This argument finds firm support in the Court’s jurisprudence. See
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (“[T]he Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency.”); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 629
(1987) (holding that efficiency may not be invoked “as a basis for infringing . . .
constitutional rights”).
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it easier for witnesses to lie and harder for juries to tell whether the
witnesses are lying.169 This objection specifically targets the
validity of the witness’s oath and the fact-finder’s fair observation
of the witness’s demeanor.170 This argument assumes that
witnesses will have a greater propensity to lie if they do not have
to physically look into the eyes of the defendant, attorneys, judge,
and jury.171 In response to the argument that the witness can “feel”
the courtroom looking at him or her via the screen, objectors claim
that it is simply not the same as true physical presence.172
Moreover, objecting scholars argue that such testimony deprives
the fact-finder of the ability to adequately observe the intangibles
of the witness’s demeanor.173 For example, the fact-finder may not
be able to watch the witness physically walk to the witness stand or
observe certain fluctuations in the witness’s voice and facial
features. This objection boils down to a preference for a factfinder’s inherent need to “feel” the witness’s presence in order to
adequately gauge his or her truthfulness.174
2. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Subject to a Crawford
Analysis
Other scholars contend that the constitutionality of two-way
live video testimony should be considered under Crawford.175
Crawford held that the prosecution may introduce testimonial
169. See Cinella, supra note 161, at 156–59. However, this argument ran into
significant problems after the William & Mary School of Law tested the effects of
video testimony on jurors and found no detrimental effects caused by the video
testimony. See generally Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A
Consideration of Today’s–and Tomorrow’s–High-Technology Courtrooms, 50
S.C. L. REV. 799 (1999); Fredric I. Lederer, The Legality and Practicality of
Remote Witness Testimony, CTR. FOR LEGAL AND COURT TECH.,
http://www.legaltechcenter.net/download/articles/The%20Legality%20And%20Pr
acticality%20Of%20Remote%20%20Witness%20Testimony.pdf, archived at http:
//perma.cc/4Z9U-24UG (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
170. See Cinella, supra note 161, at 156–59.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“There may well be intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying in a
courtroom that are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony.”). But see
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
173. See Cinella, supra note 161, at 156–59.
174. “The jury listens to words, but they respond to fear.” Louis Litt, Suits:
Sucker Punch (USA Network television broadcast Aug. 2, 2013).
175. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 96, at 1697–98; Amy Ma, Note, Mitigating
the Prosecutors’ Dilemma in Light of Melendez-Diaz: Live Two-Way
Videoconferencing for Analyst Testimony Regarding Chemical Analysis, 11
NEV. L.J. 793, 811–12 (2011).
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statements if the witness is unavailable to testify and if the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.176
These scholars argue that a witness’s testimony via two-way live
video is clearly “testimonial” in the traditional sense of the
word.177 Second, these scholars opine that, when a witness is
declared unavailable by the court, this satisfies the unavailability
prong of the Crawford analysis.178 Finally, these scholars argue
that a present opportunity to cross-examine the witness by video is
better than a prior opportunity for cross-examination in person.179
The primary objection to this argument is that Crawford only
applies to prior hearsay.180 Thus, Crawford should arguably not
apply to two-way live video testimony for three reasons. First, the
testimony is not prior to the occurrence of the trial. Instead, the
testimony is contemporaneous with the trial. Second, the testimony
is not “out of court” in the traditional sense of the term. Here, the
testimony is arguably more similar to physical, in-court testimony
because it is streamed contemporaneously in the courtroom.
Finally, under a strict textualist reading of the definition of hearsay
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, two-way live video testimony is
not hearsay because it is a statement delivered at trial, whereas
hearsay is defined as a statement not given at trial.181 Consequently,
Crawford should not govern two-way live video testimony.

176. See discussion supra Part I.B.3; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
177. See Olson, supra note 96, at 1697–98; Ma, supra note 175, at 811–12.
178. See Olson, supra note 96, at 1697–98; Ma, supra note 175, at 811–12.
179. See Olson, supra note 96, at 1697–98; Ma, supra note 175, at 811–12.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1314 n.4 (11th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (“Notably, both dissenting opinions argue (but the Government
does not) that the proper standard to be applied is that stated in [Crawford], the
most recent Supreme Court case governing the admissibility of out-of-court
testimonial statements. No doubt the Government passes on this argument
because it recognizes that Crawford applies only to testimonial statements made
prior to trial, and the live two-way video testimony at issue in this case was
presented at trial.” (citation omitted)); State v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah
2006) (“By its own terms, the Crawford holding is limited to testimonial
hearsay. Testimonial hearsay is significantly different from a child’s testimony
that is given under oath during trial and simply is transmitted into the courtroom
by electronic means.” (citation omitted)); Anthony Garofano, Comment,
Avoiding Virtual Justice: Video-Teleconference Testimony in Federal Criminal
Trials, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 708–09 (2007) (similarly arguing the
inapplicability of Crawford).
181. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement that, inter
alia, “the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or
hearing” (emphasis added)).
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3. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Subject to a Craig
Analysis
Other scholars argue that two-way live video testimony can be
constitutional under Craig.182 Under Craig, one-way live video
testimony is constitutional if it: (1) furthers an important public policy;
and (2) the video system is sufficiently reliable.183 Proponents of
Craig’s application in the two-way live video context argue that the
standard easily extends to two-way live video.184 Specifically, the first
prong of the analysis is the same, ensuring that the circumstances
further an important public policy similar to protecting child abuse
victims from further trauma.185 Moreover, two-way live video
testimony seems to be more reliable than the one-way video that
the Craig Court considered because now the witness can actually
see the defendant.186 Thus, the Craig test should apply.
Nonetheless, critics typically raise two common objections.
First, some scholars argue that the Court decided Craig uniquely in
the context of child abuse cases and, thus, its application should be
confined to child abuse cases.187 In particular, this objection
focuses on the reason the prosecutor in Craig used one-way video:
to protect the child from seeing and being in the presence of the
defendant.188 Accordingly, the intentional use of one-way video
seems to imply that the Craig Court decided the case exclusively
for circumstances involving a sexually abused child.189 Therefore,
Craig should not govern cases with facts that exceed the scope of
its holding.190
Another objection is that Craig’s reliability prong did not
survive Crawford and thus is no longer good law.191 This objection
stems from the premise that Crawford expressly overturned Ohio

182. See, e.g., Ma, supra note 175, at 812–13; Olson, supra note 96, at 1698–
1702; Garofano, supra note 180, at 709–10.
183. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
184. See, e.g., Ma, supra note 175, at 812–13; Olson, supra note 96, at 1698–
1702; Garofano, supra note 180, at 709–10.
185. See, e.g., Ma, supra note 175, at 812–13; Olson, supra note 96, at 1698–
1702; Garofano, supra note 180, at 709–10.
186. See, e.g., Ma, supra note 175, at 812–13; Olson, supra note 96, at 1698–
1701; Garofano, supra note 180, at 709–10.
187. See Rocha, supra note 153, at 391.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2007)
(rejecting the argument that Crawford overruled Craig).
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v. Roberts.192 The objection also notes that the Craig Court explicitly
relied upon Roberts’ understanding of reliability.193 Thus, the
objection deductively argues that Crawford implicitly overturned
Craig’s reliability prong as well when it overruled Roberts.194 As a
result, this objection contends that the Craig test is no longer a viable
doctrine.195 Accordingly, it would be nonsensical to apply bad law to
two-way live video testimony.196
4. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Always Unconstitutional
Finally, some scholars argue that two-way live video testimony
should never be considered constitutional.197 Mirroring many of the
arguments against the total constitutionality of such testimony, this
argument emphasizes that two-way live video testimony is not a
constitutionally permissible substitute for physical confrontation.198
Particularly, there are many intangibles that may be lost through the
video transmission, including body language not on camera.199 As a
result, witnesses may lie more freely, and it may be harder for jury
members to determine whether the witness is lying.200 Furthermore,
this argument complains that efficiency alone should not outweigh a
defendant’s fundamental right to the traditional notion of physical
confrontation.201 Such justification would lead to abuses by parties
more interested in efficiency than in protecting the defendant’s
constitutional rights.202 Thus, such testimony should be
unconstitutional.
The primary objection to blanket unconstitutionality is that
such a rule would fail to provide a safety valve for circumstances
in which a public policy is so important that bending the rule

192. See id.; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (“[I]t is
clear that Crawford announced a new rule. The Crawford rule was not ‘dictated’
by prior precedent. Quite the opposite is true: The Crawford rule is flatly
inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford
overruled.”).
193. Horn, 508 F.3d at 318–19.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Cinella, supra note 161, at 156–60.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 157–58.
200. Id. at 156–60.
201. Id. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
202. Cinella, supra note 161, at 156–60.
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would make sense.203 For example, under this proposed rule of
universal unconstitutionality of two-way live video testimony, the
child in Craig could testify via one-way live video but would not
have been able to testify via two-way live video, despite the
important public policy of protecting the child from the presence of
the defendant. Moreover, if anything, the two-way video provides
a more reliable means of procuring the testimony than the one-way
video provided in Craig. Yet, this rule would absolutely bar the
child’s testimony via two-way live video, even though Craig
would allow the child to testify via one-way live video. Therefore,
reasoning ad absurdum, the rule would be unduly restrictive.
Additionally, one might object that such a rule would
needlessly dampen courts’ efforts to integrate new technology into
the courtroom.204 This objection highlights the fact that two-way
live video testimony would streamline the trial process.205 It would
alleviate the costs of bringing witnesses physically into the
courtroom. Moreover, it would efficiently ease the procedural
stresses of the testimonial process, particularly when it is hard to
secure and retain witnesses. In sum, courts should be able to
embrace twenty-first century technology.206 This rule of uniform
unconstitutionality would inhibit that opportunity for enhanced
efficiency.
The numerous proposals as well as the conflicting
jurisprudence illustrate the unsettled state of the law concerning
the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. This
confusion thus requires a workable proposal that can alleviate the
current tensions.
III. A SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
WHETHER TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY VIOLATES THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
With these jurisprudential and scholarly trends as a background,
this Comment proposes a substantial public policy standard for twoway live video testimony that would square the trends in the lower
courts, reconcile the various scholarly proposals, and preserve Craig’s
application to one-way live video testimony. This Part first details the
aspects of the proposed substantial public policy standard, the
203. See Garofano, supra note 180, at 712 (“[A]n absolute ban on [two-way
live video] testimony ignores the value of a limited and careful application of
this powerful technology.”).
204. See Perry, supra note 154, at 592–93; Brooks, supra note 13, at 211–14.
205. See Perry, supra note 154, at 592–93; Brooks, supra note 13, at 211–14.
206. See Perry, supra note 154, at 592–93; Brooks, supra note 13, at 211–14.
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reasoning behind the proposal, and the potential functionality of
the standard. It then discusses various justifications for the
proposal, highlighting its resolution of the differing opinions
amongst both courts and scholars.
A. The Proposal
In plain terms, the proposed substantial public policy standard for
two-way live video testimony would demand less of prosecutors than
the arguably high important public policy prong of the Craig test.207
The premise of the proposed standard is that two-way live video is
an inherently more accurate approximation of physical
confrontation than one-way live video’s approximation of physical
confrontation.208 Whereas one-way live video does not permit
mutual, witness–defendant eye contact, two-way live video allows
the witness to see the defendant. As a result, two-way live video
enables potential emotional tension more typical of true physical
confrontation because the witness must virtually testify to the
defendant’s face. Two-way live video testimony is therefore more
similar to physical confrontation than is one-way live video
testimony. Consequently, the standard for two-way live video
testimony should not be as stringent as the Craig test’s important
public policy requirement because the testimony via two-way live
video is not as substantially different from physical confrontation
as is one-way live video testimony.
The proposed substantial public policy standard thus would
allow prosecutors to use two-way live video testimony not only in
207. Cf. Garofano, supra note 180, at 712 (advocating that a strict reading of
Craig applies to two-way live video testimony, and arguing that “[a]ny lesser
standard impermissibly sacrifices a defendant’s confrontation right”); Francis A.
Weber, Comment, Complying with the Confrontation Clause in the Twenty-First
Century: Guidance for Courts and Legislatures Considering VideoconferenceTestimony Provisions, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 149, 151 (2013) (“[I]n the absence of a
defendant’s consent, a constitutionally compliant statute or court rule must
condition the admissibility of videoconference testimony upon the prosecution’s
ability to meet a legal standard that is at least as stringent as the one that the
Supreme Court applied in Maryland v. Craig.”).
208. This argument might be aptly rephrased as emphasizing that two-way
video is more “reliable” than one-way video, reflecting specifically on Craig’s
admonition that the procedure “ensure[] that the testimony is both reliable and
subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony.” See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851
(1990). The proposed substantial public policy standard would certainly retain
this dedication to ensuring reliability of the video system. The scope of this
Comment and its proposal, however, is confined to elucidating what types of
policies justify the use of two-way live video testimony when an appropriately
reliable video system is used.
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circumstances where the testimony advances public policies as
important as protecting child abuse victims, but also in
circumstances where the public policy advanced is less important
and yet still substantial enough to promote the administration of
justice. In practice, courts adopting the substantial public policy
standard should retain as a compass the decisions from the lower
courts that have addressed two-way live video testimony. For
example, courts should adopt the findings of the courts that have
found that severe illnesses and unavailability due to witness
protection programs would suffice to satisfy the substantial public
policy standard.209 Similarly, courts should uniformly affirm the
use of two-way live video testimony of child abuse victims and
other child witnesses who may suffer emotional trauma from
testifying in open court.210 Likewise, this standard would approve
of the testimony in cases where witnesses have been threatened or
intimidated in attempts to prevent them from testifying.211
Moreover, the use of such testimony in cases that advance the
public policy of protecting national security would be justified
under the substantial public policy standard.212 Furthermore, the
proposed standard would allow this testimony in cases concerning
border issues that present international concerns.213 All in all, the
substantial public policy standard would permit two-way live video
testimony in circumstances that entail, inter alia, issues of national
concern and witnesses’ health and protection.214

209. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
210. See discussion supra Part II.A.1; see also State v. Collins, 65 So. 3d 271
(La. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Lujan, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727 (Ct. App. 2012)
(allowing two-way live video testimony from child witnesses in both cases)
(modified on rehearing on other grounds).
211. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 958 N.E.2d 977 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)
(allowing two-way live video testimony from witnesses that had been
intimidated by the defendant’s associates).
212. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“[N]o governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”); see also United
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the
deference shown to the political branches of government when deciding cases
that implicate sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military
affairs).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenau, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (W.D.
Wash. 2012) (stating that “the public policy interest in allowing the Government
to effectively try cases regarding the breach of international boundaries by
smuggling of narcotics by air into the United States is sufficiently important to
justify permitting live video testimony”).
214. To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list. In extraordinary circumstances
that demonstrate a clearly substantial public policy, courts should retain the
flexibility to allow such testimony.

206

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

On the other end of the spectrum, however, courts should also
adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s general rule that mere efficiency and
convenience cannot justify the use of two-way live video testimony.215
To that end, the potential for cost savings would be similarly
inadequate to satisfy the substantial public policy standard.216 On a
greater scale, an ambiguous “generalized interest in law enforcement”
would fail to meet the substantial public policy standard.217 In short,
prosecutors would have to demonstrate circumstances, which, contrary
to these efficiency and convenience arguments, entail unique factual
complications that would not be present in every run-of-the-mill case.
Building upon these foundations, courts should infer general principles
that would likely be recognized across the nation as public policies that
would satisfy the proposed substantial public policy standard.
B. The Proposal’s Practical and Theoretical Justifications
The primary virtues of the proposed substantial public policy
standard lie within its resolution of the various debates surrounding
the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. This Section
first describes the proposal’s resolution of judicial disagreements
and then turns to its resolution of scholarly disagreements.
1. Resolution of Judicial Disagreements
The proposed substantial public policy standard accomplishes
three important objectives in response to the underlying judicial
concerns surrounding two-way live video testimony. First, the
215. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (“The district court made no case-specific findings of fact that would
support a conclusion that this case is different from any other criminal
prosecution in which the Government would find it convenient to present
testimony by two-way video conference.”); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009) (“[R]espondent asks us to relax the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause to accommodate the ‘necessities of
trial and the adversary process.’ It is not clear whence we would derive the
authority to do so. The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of
criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury
and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like
those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at
our convenience.” (citation omitted)).
216. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musser, 82 Va. Cir. 265 (Cir. Ct. 2011)
(rejecting the prosecutor’s request for “permission to save money and
inconvenience by presenting the testimony of [the witness] through two-way
videoconferencing technology”).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“Craig plainly requires a public interest more substantial than convicting
someone of a criminal offense.”).
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proposed standard resolves the overarching circuit split between the
Second Circuit and its sister circuits concerning whether Craig applies
to two-way live video testimony.218 It does so by borrowing the
strengths and concerns from both sides of the split. From Gigante, the
proposal borrows the Second Circuit’s reasoning that proponents of
two-way live video testimony should not have to satisfy Craig’s
incredibly high “important public policy” test; instead, prosecutors
need only meet a less rigorous version of the Craig test.219 From the
circuits that have adopted Craig in the two-way live video context, the
proposal concurs with and endorses Craig’s continued application to
one-way live video testimony, requiring a public policy as important
as that of protecting child abuse victims.220 The proposal additionally
incorporates Craig’s understanding that certain public policies justify a
witness’s physical absence during the witness’s testimony.221 The
proposal further imports Craig’s understanding that these public
policies must necessarily be substantial to validate depriving a
defendant of physical confrontation with a witness.222 Thus, strains of
reasoning from both sides of the circuit split comprise the substantial
public policy standard, thereby reconciling the split.
On a deeper level, the proposal addresses and eliminates the
confusion amongst lower courts concerning how the Craig test would
or should apply to two-way live video testimony.223 The courts
currently engage in a “vertical” analysis to determine whether the
circumstances surrounding the two-way live video testimony meet the
Craig test. That is, they first articulate Craig’s holding as the
governing standard.224 They then illustrate the “important public
policy” test by highlighting the public policy of protecting child
abuse victims from further trauma.225 As a result, courts look up to
this single important policy as emblematic of the types of extreme
situations that must be present to justify the use of two-way live
video testimony. This proposal eliminates that hierarchical
pressure by instead endorsing a “horizontal” analysis. Under this
analysis and the proposed framework,226 courts would look not up
218. See discussion supra Part II.A.
219. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
220. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See discussion supra Part II.A.1–2.
224. See, e.g., Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 315 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting
that although “the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
the use of two-way closed-circuit television,” it has decided Craig, which should
be controlling); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1312–15 (11th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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to an extreme standard, but to each other’s decisions in a quest for
common ground. This process would thus focus courts on more
common scenarios rather than on the factually unique—and
incredibly sensitive—child abuse cases for which Craig was
created. In so doing, the proposal would enable easier judicial
assent to common lines of reasoning, thereby creating firm
precedent concerning circumstances where two-way live video
testimony is constitutional.
Finally, the proposal mitigates—if not eliminates—the
opportunities for judicial subjectivity that the Supreme Court so
heavily denounced in Crawford.227 The proposal’s emphasized
reliance upon well-recognized, substantial public policies deprives
courts of the ability to create ad hoc reasons that justify the use of
two-way live video testimony. Contrary to the Second Circuit’s
Gigante test and Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this proposal maintains a higher standard than the discretionary
“exceptional circumstances” and “compelling circumstances”
standards.228 The proposal guards against case-by-case judicial
determinations that might create inter-jurisdictional conflicts. Instead,
the proposal promotes deference to well-recognized public policies,
thereby requiring public policy to be the source of the rule rather than
judicial subjectivity.
2. Resolution of Scholarly Disagreements
The proposed substantial public policy standard likewise
answers scholars’ concerns in numerous ways. One notable
justification for this proposal is that it guards against the potential
abuses of two-way live video testimony while simultaneously
quelling fears of the complete unavailability of the option to use
two-way live video testimony. With respect to the fears that
prosecutors might rely too heavily upon the ease of such
testimony,229 this proposal answers those fears by retaining as
227. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–63 (2004) (deploring the
“unpredictability” and “entirely subjective” aspects of the Roberts framework,
which “depend[ed] heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much
weight he accords each of them”).
228. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Upon a
finding of exceptional circumstances, such as were found in this case, a trial
court may allow a witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit television when
this furthers the interest of justice.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“For good cause in
compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit
testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different
location.”).
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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persuasive Craig’s extremely high “important public policy” test.
Of course, the substantial public policy standard provides for a less
stringent interpretation of the Craig test; however, it retains significant
public policies as the mainstay of the standard, thereby disallowing
rampant use of the testimony for less important purposes such as
efficiency. With respect to the fears of the complete unavailability of
the use of two-way live video testimony,230 this proposal—in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent—dispels those fears by
providing for the complete availability of such testimony in
circumstances that implicate substantial public policies. Instead of
completely ignoring the advances of technology and its aid in
obtaining testimony in unique circumstances, this proposal explicitly
constructs an avenue through which parties may utilize the technology.
Thus, the proposal eliminates the many fears surrounding the potential
complete use or potential complete unavailability of two-way live
video testimony.
Relatedly, the proposal resolves scholars’ disagreement
concerning whether Craig should apply to two-way live video
testimony.231 The proposal agrees with proponents of such an
application by adopting the general reasoning that undergirded the
Craig decision. Yet, the proposal also agrees with opponents of such
an application, preserving and ensuring Craig’s sole application to
cases involving one-way video testimony and child abuse victims.
Moreover, the proposal acknowledges the additional objection that
Craig’s reasoning is no longer good law after Crawford, but the
proposal simply notes that the Court has cited Craig with approval on
two occasions after Crawford, specifically relying upon Craig’s
emphasis on reliability.232 Thus, presumably Craig’s reliability prong
survived Crawford and therefore justifies continued reliance upon a
reliability requirement in the context of live video testimony.233
Lastly, the proposal bridges the gap between disagreements
concerning whether Crawford’s hearsay analysis should govern by
acknowledging the strongest arguments from both sides.234 The
proposal acknowledges that there are circumstances where two230. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
231. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
232. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (plurality opinion) (noting that Craig stands for the proposition that
“[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the
evidence against a criminal defendant”) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
845 (1990)); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (also discussing
Craig’s emphasis on reliability).
233. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (explaining this Comment’s
treatment of Craig’s reliability prong).
234. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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way live video testimony allowed under the substantial public
policy standard would also satisfy Crawford’s requirements of
witness unavailability and an opportunity for cross-examination of
the witness.235 However, under the proposed standard, witness
unavailability should be neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for satisfying the substantial public policy standard.
Because this proposal is an extension of Craig’s reasoning, the
proposal should remain true to the factual underpinnings in Craig.
There, the child was never declared unavailable; indeed, the child
was actually seemingly available.236 Thus, this apparent lack of a
requirement of witness unavailability should similarly govern in
the substantial public policy standard. Taking into account the
argument that Crawford is completely inapplicable, this proposal
takes a middle-of-the-road approach, acknowledging that Crawford
may be satisfied in some circumstances under the proposed standard
but ultimately agreeing that Crawford should chiefly apply to true
hearsay alone and not to live video testimony.
All in all, the proposed substantial public policy standard provides
the Supreme Court with an efficient, workable standard that
systematically addresses and alleviates the concerns surrounding the
constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. Most importantly, it
remains true to the reasons underlying the Court’s Confrontation
Clause precedent while simultaneously modifying the precedent to
adapt to increasingly popular technology and circumstances not at
issue in that precedent. The proposed standard thus represents an
attractive solution to an otherwise vexing problem.
CONCLUSION
In an era of constant innovation, it makes sense to embrace the
inevitable technological facelift of the courtroom by amending
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence accordingly. Two-way live
video testimony has generated uncertainty amongst courts and
scholars alike, providing spirited discussions and equally spirited
disagreements. As a result, the Supreme Court should provide
235. Indeed, Crawford would be satisfied every time a court declared a
witness unavailable, because two-way live video allows contemporaneous crossexamination. See discussion supra Parts I.B.3, II.B.2.
236. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (Marcus, J., dissenting) (“The most important distinction is that the child
witnesses in Craig were not unavailable; the court could have compelled them to
testify in open court in the usual manner.”); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
865–66 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the child did not seem to be
unavailable because the child was only unwilling to testify in the presence of the
defendant).
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guidance to lower courts, dictating the correct path that courts
should take to determine the constitutionality of two-way live
video testimony. Moreover, this process should coincide with
current Supreme Court precedent and assuage the fears of abuse or
the unavailability of such testimony. The proposed substantial
public policy standard, which allows furtherance of less important
public policies to justify the use of the testimony, accomplishes
these objectives. It takes the arguments from competing sides of
the current debates and fuses them together in support of the
proposed standard. This unification is crucial in light of the
currently conflicted Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The
substantial public policy standard presents the best path forward to
consistently analyzing confrontation in a FaceTime generation.
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